Financial Forensics: The Due Diligence Files

Forensic dissection of capital markets collapses.Not headlines — mechanisms. How money moved. Where structures broke.T1 — Full autopsy. The collapse, the actors, the moment nobody stopped it.T2 — GP/LP room. 3 red flags in the documents. Due diligence questions. Active parallels in deals running today. For allocators, GPs, and fund professionals.Hosted by Sergio Stieben — 15 years in GP/LP relations, cross-border finance US-LatAm-Europe.Try FFL Trial, free — run a deal through the same engine, scored against 140 documented collapses: https://risk-pattern-scan.lovable.app

Financial Forensics: The Due Diligence Files is a business podcast hosted by Sergio Stieben, with 332 episodes on record and a Required Pod Score of 80. PitchCentric scores this show on Booking Probability, Listen Score, and live audience signals refreshed every 24 hours.

Sergio Stieben hosts Financial Forensics: The Due Diligence Files, a business show with 332 episodes published.

Our AI reads these to draft pitches. Use them as grounding for a pitch that cites a real guest and a specific topic.

• 

  Episode #167

  Silvergate Bank 2023: Payment Network Concentration & Counterparty Single-Point-of-Failure │ GP/LP Analysis - 3 Red Flags │ File 167 T2

  Sep 12, 202613 minS2

  This episode is part of Financial Forensics Labs — two shows, one forensic methodology: The Due Diligence Files traces how institutions collapse, The Signal Files traces how the good calls get made. Built from primary-record research by a 15-year capital markets professional. Get to know the framework, the other show, and the tools built from it — all in one place. Explore ⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠Financial Forensics Labs — Forensic Finance Intelligence⁠⁠⁠⁠ Silvergate Bank 2023: the GP/LP institutional analysis — how a payment network's core advantage became a bank's core liability, and three red flags sitting in the company's own public filings that nobody with the authority to act on them appears to have run.This is the deep-dive institutional layer of the Silvergate Bank file. We break down the exact mechanism by which the Silvergate Exchange Network's instant, 24/7 settlement design turned a diversified-looking deposit base into a single correlated block of crypto-industry money, why a credit rating never captures concentration risk, and how a fifteen-month gap in automated BSA/AML monitoring collided with roughly nine billion dollars in suspicious FTX and Alameda Research transfers. We isolate three specific red flags calculable straight from Silvergate's own public quarterly filings — deposit concentration ratio, transaction volume versus disclosed compliance language, and the difference between a balance-sheet snapshot and a transaction-flow number — plus an active due diligence framework for allocators, treasurers, and credit professionals who concentrate a material share of banking, custody, or settlement relationships in a single counterparty.This episode is Part 2 (T2) of the Silvergate Bank file, the GP/LP analytical layer for institutional listeners. Part 1 (T1) is the narrative account for a general audience, on the same feed.Financial Forensics Labs dissects the world's biggest financial collapses, fraud cases, and institutional failures — layer by layer, case by case.Keywords: Silvergate Bank, SEN network, Silvergate Exchange Network, crypto banking collapse, FTX Alameda Research, Alan Lane, Digital Currency Group, Genesis Global Capital, crypto bank run 2023, Silicon Valley Bank, Signature Bank, banking infrastructure risk, counterparty concentration risk, BSA AML compliance failure, SEC enforcement crypto, voluntary bank liquidation, crypto contagion 2022, deposit concentration risk, treasury risk management, due diligence framework, financial forensics, bank failure case study, crypto industry collapse, Federal Home Loan Bank, discount window borrowing, related party risk, institutional due diligence, single point of failure banking, crypto lending crisis, GP LP analysis, Financial Forensics Labs

  ListenShow Notes
• 

  Episode #167

  Silvergate Bank 2023 : Every Major Crypto Exchange Cleared Through One Pipe. When the Bank Closed, So Did the Plumbing │ File 167 T1

  Sep 12, 202611 minS1

  This episode is part of Financial Forensics Labs — two shows, one forensic methodology: The Due Diligence Files traces how institutions collapse, The Signal Files traces how the good calls get made. Built from primary-record research by a 15-year capital markets professional. Get to know the framework, the other show, and the tools built from it — all in one place. Explore ⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠Financial Forensics Labs — Forensic Finance Intelligence⁠⁠⁠⁠ Silvergate Bank 2023: how a single California bank became the payment rail nearly every major crypto exchange used to move dollars in and out of the industry — and how the same speed that built its deposits emptied them in one quarter.This is the financial autopsy of Silvergate Bank, the company behind the Silvergate Exchange Network (SEN), a private, 24/7 instant-settlement system connecting crypto exchanges, trading desks, and institutional accounts to the U.S. dollar banking system. We trace how a mid-sized regional bank grew its deposit base more than sevenfold by becoming nearly the only banking option for an entire asset class, why roughly nine out of every ten dollars on its balance sheet came from one industry vertical, and how a compliance monitoring gap running for more than a year collided with the collapse of FTX and Alameda Research in November 2022. In one quarter, digital-asset deposits fell by roughly seventy percent. Two emergency Federal credit lines and a $718 million securities loss later, Silvergate chose voluntary liquidation rather than wait for a regulator — two weeks before Silicon Valley Bank and Signature Bank failed the conventional way.This episode is Part 1 (T1) of the Silvergate Bank file, the narrative account for a general audience. Part 2 (T2) breaks down the GP/LP institutional layer: the exact mechanism, three red flags sitting in public filings, and the active due diligence framework for anyone concentrating a banking or settlement relationship in a single counterparty.Financial Forensics Labs dissects the world's biggest financial collapses, fraud cases, and institutional failures — layer by layer, case by case.Keywords: Silvergate Bank, SEN network, Silvergate Exchange Network, crypto banking collapse, FTX Alameda Research, Alan Lane, Digital Currency Group, Genesis Global Capital, crypto bank run 2023, Silicon Valley Bank, Signature Bank, banking infrastructure risk, counterparty concentration risk, BSA AML compliance failure, SEC enforcement crypto, voluntary bank liquidation, crypto contagion 2022, deposit concentration risk, treasury risk management, due diligence framework, financial forensics, bank failure case study, crypto industry collapse, Federal Home Loan Bank, discount window borrowing, related party risk, institutional due diligence, single point of failure banking, crypto lending crisis, financial autopsy, Financial Forensics Labs

  ListenShow Notes
• 

  Episode #166

  Genesis Global 2023: Intra-Group Note, No Real Repayment Source │ GP/LP Analysis - 3 Red Flags │ File 166 T2

  Sep 6, 202612 minS2

  This episode is part of Financial Forensics Labs — two shows, one forensic methodology: The Due Diligence Files traces how institutions collapse, The Signal Files traces how the good calls get made. Built from primary-record research by a 15-year capital markets professional. Get to know the framework, the other show, and the tools built from it — all in one place. Explore ⁠⁠⁠⁠Financial Forensics Labs — Forensic Finance Intelligence⁠⁠⁠ Genesis Global Capital 2023: intra-group crypto lending gap and counterparty concentration risk. If a parent company can erase a billion-dollar loss at its subsidiary with a piece of paper promising to pay it back in ten years, why would any parent ever choose cash instead? This is the GP/LP institutional analysis of Genesis Global Capital and Digital Currency Group (DCG) — the mechanism by which a real, already-realized lending loss was converted into an intercompany promissory note that let both the parent and the subsidiary keep operating as though the loss had been resolved, and why that kind of note is not the same thing as capital. Genesis lent institutional money to crypto hedge funds and trading desks, funded largely by retail crypto deposited through partner exchanges. Three Arrows Capital (3AC), a highly leveraged Singapore-based fund with total exposure to Genesis above $2 billion, could not meet a margin call after Terra and Luna collapsed in May 2022. Genesis liquidated the collateral it could reach — Grayscale Bitcoin Trust (GBTC) shares, Grayscale Ethereum Trust (ETHE) shares, and smaller tokens — and was still short roughly $1.2 billion. That number was not an estimate. It was a realized, permanent loss, fixed the moment the collateral was sold. In June 2022, DCG issued Genesis a $1.1 billion promissory note, maturing in 2032, at 1% interest. No cash moved. No crypto moved. We break down the three questions that were never forced to a real answer at the time: what was the note's actual, independent source of repayment; why did its terms look nothing like a genuine arm's-length risk transfer; and why did Genesis keep marketing new Gemini Earn deposits without disclosing the loss already sitting behind the program's economics. More than 340,000 Gemini Earn depositors, over $900 million, were frozen when Genesis halted withdrawals on November 16, 2022, days after FTX's collapse added a further $175 million hole. Cameron Winklevoss's open letters to Barry Silbert, the SEC's charges against Genesis and Gemini for an unregistered security, and Genesis's Chapter 11 filing on January 19, 2023 all trace back to the same unresolved question: a guarantee whose only real source of repayment circles back to the value of the entity it exists to protect is not external support. It is the same risk, wearing a different label. This episode delivers the active due diligence framework for related-party guarantees: how to identify the true source of repayment before assigning it any value, how to price related-party terms against a genuine third-party creditor's demand, and why silence about an already-realized loss equals an affirmative misrepresentation. This is the second file in the Financial Forensics Labs Crypto Contagion Arc — from FTX and Alameda Research, to Genesis and DCG, to Silvergate Bank next. It connects to the FTX file from the opposite direction: there, a number was fabricated inside a closed loop. Here, the loss was real from day one — only the appearance of resolution was manufactured. Every collapse has a pattern. We dissect it. Layer by layer. The T1 narrative version of this same case is available on this same feed. Financial Forensics Labs: for GP/LP relations and due diligence professionals who need the mechanism behind the headline.

  ListenShow Notes
• 

  Episode #166

  Genesis Global 2023: A $1.1B Loss, Paid With a 10-Year IOU │ File 166 T1

  Sep 6, 202612 minS1

  This episode is part of Financial Forensics Labs — two shows, one forensic methodology: The Due Diligence Files traces how institutions collapse, The Signal Files traces how the good calls get made. Built from primary-record research by a 15-year capital markets professional. Get to know the framework, the other show, and the tools built from it — all in one place. Explore ⁠⁠⁠⁠Financial Forensics Labs — Forensic Finance Intelligence⁠⁠⁠ Genesis Global Capital 2023: the largest institutional crypto lender in the world had a $1.1 billion hole in its balance sheet after Three Arrows Capital defaulted. Digital Currency Group filled it with a ten-year promissory note. Not cash. This is the financial autopsy of Genesis Global Capital, the crypto lending arm of Barry Silbert's Digital Currency Group (DCG), and the counterparty concentration and intra-group balance sheet opacity that let a real, already-crystallized loss disappear from view for five months while new retail deposits kept arriving. In May 2022, the collapse of Terra and Luna wiped out roughly forty billion dollars in crypto value in a matter of days. Three Arrows Capital (3AC), a Singapore-based hedge fund and one of Genesis's largest borrowers, could not meet a margin call. Genesis moved to liquidate the collateral it could reach — shares of the Grayscale Bitcoin Trust (GBTC), shares of the Grayscale Ethereum Trust (ETHE), and a stack of smaller tokens — and was still short roughly $1.2 billion. The loss was real, permanent, and fixed the day the collateral was sold. No market recovery could undo it. In June 2022, instead of injecting cash or crypto, DCG issued Genesis a $1.1 billion promissory note, due in ten years, at just 1% interest. On paper, the hole in Genesis's balance sheet was gone, replaced by a clean receivable from its own parent company. In practice, DCG's only real source of repayment was its own equity stake in Genesis itself — the very company the note existed to rescue. Genesis kept accepting new retail deposits through its Gemini Earn partnership with Cameron and Tyler Winklevoss's exchange, without ever disclosing the loss sitting behind the note. More than 340,000 Gemini Earn customers eventually had roughly $900 million frozen when Genesis halted all withdrawals on November 16, 2022 — days after FTX's collapse exposed a further $175 million hole and forced the older, larger problem into the open. This episode covers Cameron Winklevoss's public open letters accusing Barry Silbert and DCG of a "carefully crafted campaign of lies," the SEC's January 2023 charges against both Genesis and Gemini for offering an unregistered security through Gemini Earn, and Genesis Global Capital's Chapter 11 bankruptcy filing on January 19, 2023. We dissect the mechanism layer by layer: how a real, already-realized loss becomes an intercompany asset on paper, and why nobody with the standing to demand an answer ever forced Digital Currency Group to explain what it would actually pay that note with, if it were ever called. This is the second file in the Financial Forensics Labs Crypto Contagion Arc — from FTX and Alameda Research, to Genesis and DCG, to Silvergate Bank. Every collapse has a pattern. We dissect it. Layer by layer. For the full GP/LP institutional analysis of this case — the exact note structure, the three unasked questions that should have surfaced before a single dollar of new customer money arrived, and the active due diligence framework for related-party guarantees — listen to the companion T2 episode on this same feed. Financial Forensics Labs is the podcast that treats every financial collapse as a case file: the mechanism, the red flags that were sitting in public records the whole time, and what it means for anyone evaluating a deal today.

  ListenShow Notes
• 

  Episode #164

  Purdue Pharma 2019 : The Sackler Fortune & The Bankruptcy Shield│File 164 T1

  Aug 25, 202610 minS1

  This episode is part of Financial Forensics Labs — two shows, one forensic methodology: The Due Diligence Files traces how institutions collapse, The Signal Files traces how the good calls get made. Built from primary-record research by a 15-year capital markets professional. Get to know the framework, the other show, and the tools built from it — all in one place. Explore ⁠⁠Financial Forensics Labs — Forensic Finance Intelligence⁠⁠ In September 2019, Purdue Pharma filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy under the weight of thousands of state, municipal, and individual claims stemming from the nationwide opioid crisis. However, internal balance sheet records show that the company's ultimate financial restructuring began more than a decade prior. Following Purdue’s 2007 federal guilty plea for misbranding OxyContin, ownership dramatically shifted its annual revenue distribution ratio from under 15% to as high as 70%. Between 2008 and 2016, the Sackler family extracted approximately $11 billion from the enterprise, draining roughly three-quarters of its total asset base before the mass tort liabilities could fully crystallize in court. The extracted capital was systematically routed through a web of offshore holding companies, Jersey-based trusts, and Swiss bank accounts, creating a jurisdictional shield designed to complicate future creditor attachment. When Purdue eventually entered bankruptcy court, the controlling family attempted to secure absolute civil immunity through non-consensual third-party releases without ever placing their personal fortunes into federal bankruptcy jurisdiction. Under the initial 2021 reorganization plan, the family proposed contributing $4.5 billion back into the estate over nine years in exchange for a full legal release binding on all claimants, including thousands of victims who explicitly voted against the deal. On June 27, 2024, the United States Supreme Court struck down the proposed architecture in a historic 5-to-4 ruling, establishing that bankruptcy courts lack statutory authority to extinguish claims against non-debtors without explicit claimant consent. This decision forced a revised 2025 settlement framework where family contributions rose to between $6.5 and $7.0 billion—a nearly 60% increase—bound strictly to consenting parties. This financial autopsy dissects the mechanics of pre-bankruptcy asset extraction, offshore wealth preservation, and the collapse of non-debtor release mechanisms in modern corporate restructurings. The Signal Files — Every advantage leaves behind a signal. We trace it.

  ListenShow Notes

Recent guests on Financial Forensics: The Due Diligence Files. Study who booked and why before you pitch.

Based on semantic analysis of episode topics and host coverage, this show is a strong guest fit for executives in:

Industry fit is computed by PitchCentric using vector embeddings of the show's episode catalog.